ClearBank Limited · DRN-6296003

The complaint N, a limited company, has complained about ClearBank Limited (trading as Tide) only refunding half of the money N lost to a scam. Mr G, as director, is representing N. What happened In summary, in 2025, scammers called Mr G from a withheld number and claimed to be from Tide. They claimed that there’d been large payments attempted from N’s account, and told Mr G that he needed to approve the transactions in order to stop them. Under the scammers’ instructions, Mr G authorised a £4,000 card payment from N’s Tide account to a well-known retail payment platform. He then saw the account’s balance go down despite the scammers’ story. He ended the call and contacted Tide directly. Tide tried raising a chargeback, but this was unsuccessful. They explained they were unable to cancel the payment, but accepted they could have flagged the payment at the time and intervened. They thought the liability for the loss should be shared, arguing that Mr G had also not kept N’s account sufficiently safe. They refunded half the loss (£2,000) to N. Our investigator looked into things independently and thought Tide’s offer was fair, except for that they’d left off a small amount of compensatory simple interest. Tide agreed to pay simple interest at the rate of 8% per year. Mr G asked for an ombudsman’s final decision. What I’ve decided – and why I’ve considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what’s fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. First, I understand that N was victim to a cruel scam and the scammers caused Mr G a good deal of distress, for which he has my sympathy. I appreciate this cannot have been an easy matter to face, and I appreciate why Mr G would like to try to get N’s money back. We must keep in mind that it’s the scammers who are primarily responsible for their own scam, and it’s the scammers who really owe N its money back. But in this case between N and Tide, I’m just looking at what N and Tide might be liable for. It’s not in dispute that Mr G approved the payment on behalf of N, and the payment was properly authenticated through the normal in-app procedure. So although Mr G was acting under pressure and deception, and although he didn’t intend for N’s money to end up benefitting scammers, under the Payment Services Regulations the payment is considered authorised, and in the first instance, N is liable for the payments which it (or Mr G on its behalf) authorises. Further, broadly speaking, Tide had an obligation to follow N’s instructions – the starting position in law is that banks are expected to process payments which a customer authorises them to make.

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I appreciate why Mr G wanted Tide to have stopped the payment, not least given that he reported it shortly afterwards. But while the payment would’ve shown as “pending” for a time, that’s just to do with the way such card payments are processed and settled. Once it was authorised, it was essentially gone from Tide’s end very quickly. So even though Mr G spoke to Tide soon after, by that time it was too late for Tide to reasonably be able to stop the payment from their end. I appreciate this is not intuitive. Tide should have been on the lookout for payments which could be the result of fraud or scams, to help prevent them. But a balance must be struck between identifying and responding to potentially fraudulent payments, and ensuring there’s minimal disruption to legitimate payments. Here, it’s debatable whether Tide should’ve intervened or not. While this payment was substantial in size, N had paid similar or larger amounts in the preceding period, it was made from a more than sufficient balance, and this was a business account rather than a personal account, which was set up to handle larger amounts than personal day-to-day spending and indeed did sometimes handle substantial balances. This was only a single one-off payment and not, for example, a series of many rapid payments. And it was approved in-app by the genuine customer, to go to a well-known, established company. With that said, Tide have agreed that they should have intervened given factors like the payment’s size relative to N’s other card payments, and its new payee. And had Tide intervened and asked reasonable questions, it seems most likely that they could have uncovered the scam and stopped the loss. I’ve seen nothing to suggest that Mr G wouldn’t have been honest about what was going on, and this was a relatively prominent type of scam, so I think Tide would have been able to quickly identify what was happening and prevent it. So it doesn’t seem unreasonable for Tide to bear some liability for the loss. But the matter doesn’t end there. I must also think carefully about N’s role in what happened. While Tide had a level of responsibility to keep N’s account safe, equally so did N. And so even if Tide (arguably) made a mistake in not intervening, it doesn’t necessarily follow that they must bear all the liability. We’re not here to issue fines or to punish firms for making mistakes; we’re here to decide complaints fairly. And in order to decide this case fairly, I must take into account both sides’ actions and responsibilities. I appreciate that Mr G naturally felt pressured by the situation. And I appreciate that the scammers did things like using common banking phrases, and pretending to transfer Mr G to another department, and they knew things like Mr G and N’s names. However, I’m afraid I think Mr G ought to have had more concerns along the way about what he was being told and asked to do. He’d received a call from a withheld number, and from what he’s described, it doesn’t sound like the scammers did anything which substantially verified that they were who they said they were. For example, the names of limited companies and their directors are public and straightforward to look up. Similarly, it doesn’t sound like Mr G did anything to substantially verify who he was talking to, such as checking Tide’s in-app caller verification or contacting Tide directly before proceeding. The scammers’ assertion – that he “needed to approve a transaction solely for the purpose of stopping [it]” – doesn’t sound especially plausible. And to authorise the payment, Mr G went through a process which detailed the payment and was clear that he’d be approving it rather than stopping it. It also displayed a very relevant warning about this exact sort of scam. And I’m afraid I can’t agree that it was reasonable for him to ignore that warning. As described above, I don’t think he’d been given sufficient reason to be so certain that he was already talking to Tide.

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So I can’t reasonably hold Tide solely liable for the loss. While Tide may have arguably not done enough to keep N’s account safe, equally the same would be true of N. So if Tide are liable to refund some of the loss, I find it’s fair for them to share that liability with N. Tide have already refunded their share of the financial loss, coming to £2,000. They have also now agreed to pay simple interest for the days where N was without that £2,000, at the rate of 8% simple per year. I think that’s a fair way to compensate N for the days where it was without that money. In terms of non-financial losses, I appreciate that Mr G found the matter most distressing. Again, he has my sympathy there. Though again, I must keep in mind that it’s the scammers who scammed N, not Tide, and it’s the scammers who are really responsible for the resulting distress. And perhaps more importantly, this complaint has come from N, a limited company, which is a distinct entity to Mr G. Mr G is not the eligible complainant here, N is. So in a complaint brought by N, I’m not able to make personal awards to Mr G for the distress he personally suffered. And N, being a legal entity rather than a living person, is unable to suffer distress itself, so I couldn’t make an additional award to N either. Finally, I’ve considered what Tide did to try to recover the money after Mr G told them about the scam. Unfortunately, it wasn’t reasonably possible for Tide to stop or forcibly take back the payment. As it was a card payment, it was not covered by schemes like the CRM Code or the PSR’s latest rules either. And while it was nice of Tide to try a chargeback, there was no chargeback route which would’ve been likely to work here. A chargeback would be a claim against the genuine retail payment platform, not the scammers. And the retail platform provided their service. There was no realistic prospect of success for a chargeback here, and I’m afraid there was nothing more that Tide could’ve reasonably done which would’ve realistically got the money back in this case. So while I’m very sorry to hear about what the scammers did to N and Mr G, I think it was fair for Tide to reimburse £2,000 to N, and I think they’ve made a fair offer to pay N simple interest for the days it was without the £2,000. I can’t fairly tell Tide to do more than that. Putting things right ClearBank Limited (trading as Tide) should pay N simple interest on the £2,000 it has reimbursed, at the rate of 8% simple per year. This is payable from the date the disputed payment debited until the date it was reimbursed. If Tide considers that they’re required by HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC) to deduct tax from that simple interest, they should tell N how much tax they’ve taken off. They should also give N a tax deduction certificate if it asks for one. N may be able to reclaim the tax from HMRC if it doesn’t normally pay tax.

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My final decision For the reasons I’ve explained, I think ClearBank Limited (trading as Tide) should pay N the simple interest as they’ve agreed to do. I do not make any further award. If N accepts the final decision, Tide must pay it within 28 days of the date our service notifies them of the acceptance. Under the rules of the Financial Ombudsman Service, I’m required to ask N to accept or reject my decision before 25 May 2026. Adam Charles Ombudsman

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