Financial Ombudsman Service decision
DRN-6136103
The verbatim text of this Financial Ombudsman Service decision. Sourced directly from the FOS published decisions register. Consumer names are reduced to initials by FOS at point of publication. Not an AI summary, not a paraphrase — every word below is the original decision.
Full decision
The complaint Mr C has complained about the quality of a car provided on finance by N.I.I.B. Group Limited trading as Northridge Finance. He also complained that key features of the car had been misrepresented. What happened The events surrounding this complaint are well known to both parties, so I’ll only summarise what happened briefly here. Northridge supplied Mr C with a used car on a hire purchase agreement in May 2025. The cash price of the car was around £15,800 and it had covered around 76,000 miles since first registration in May 2022. Mr C paid a deposit of £700. The hire purchase agreement required payments of around £256 for 48 months followed by an optional final payment of around £7,200. The finance was arranged by a broker I’ll call Broker D and the car was sourced by Mr C from a dealer I’ll call Dealer B. Mr C said that he was explicitly assured by Dealer B that Android Auto was freely available, and that other essential remote functionalities (scheduling charging, checking range and pre- heating) would be available through the manufacturer application. He said he discovered that all of these features were hidden behind a paywall which was not disclosed during the sale. He also said that one of the two car keys was missing its outer casing which was not disclosed prior to sale. In addition, Mr C said that he was unable to charge the car as expected and got error messages when he tried to do so. He said he tried to exercise his short term right to reject but Dealer B said he needed to allow an opportunity to inspect the car which he refused. Mr C complained to Northridge in July 2025. In summary he said: • There was a misrepresentation of the mobile application and functionalities • There was an undisclosed defect in relation to the key • There was a failure of charging functionality • He asked to reject the car with a full refund of deposit and consequential losses. Northridge said that the evidence supplied didn’t demonstrate that the car wasn’t of satisfactory quality at the point of supply as set out in the Consumer Rights Act 2015 (CRA), so it didn’t uphold the complaint. Mr C referred his complaint to the Financial Ombudsman. An investigator here looked at the complaint. He thought that there was insufficient evidence that the car wasn’t of satisfactory quality when it was supplied, and he wasn’t persuaded there was a misrepresentation. He explained that Northridge was not responsible for the negotiations carried out by Dealer B. Mr C disagreed. In summary he said: • The paywalled nature of the remote features was only discoverable after taking delivery of the car. • He explicitly stated that the features were deal breaker requirements and Dealer B verbally confirmed their presence. This formed the description of the goods under section 11 of the CRA and the discovery of the features having a paywall is a direct
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breach of contract. • The core misrepresentation is the omission of the fact that some of the functions are locked behind a paywall. There was a failure under Section 10 of the CRA regarding fitness for a particular purpose. Dealer B acted as Northridge’s agent and had a duty to ensure the goods match the description and were fit for the purpose made known to them. Section 56 of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 made Northridge responsible for Dealer B’s misrepresentations. • There was a critical charging defect which was also in breach of the CRA, and he had met the evidentiary standard. • The additional damaged key fob was an aggregate failure of quality. • Dealer B had refused to witness the fault and inspecting it at a different site wouldn’t replicate it under the same conditions. • He maintained his right to exercise the short term right to reject and that Northridge was jointly and severally liable for breaches under section 75 of the Consumer Credit Act 1974. • He had exercised his short term right to reject, and the fault was evidenced and reported in the required timeframe. Mr C asked for an ombudsman to make a decision, so it’s been passed to me. What I’ve decided – and why I’ve considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what’s fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. When considering what is, in my opinion, fair and reasonable, I take into account relevant law and regulations; regulator’s rules, guidance and standards; codes of practice; and what I believe to have been good industry practice at the relevant time. I’ve read and considered the evidence submitted by both parties, but I’ll focus my comments on what I think is relevant. If I don’t comment on a specific point, it isn’t because I haven’t considered it, but because I don’t think I need to comment in order to reach what I think is the right outcome. This is not intended as a discourtesy but reflects the informal nature of this service in resolving disputes. Where the evidence is incomplete, inconclusive, or contradictory (as some of it is here), I reach my decision on the balance of probabilities – in other words, what I consider is most likely to have happened in light of the available evidence and the wider circumstances. The agreement in this case is a regulated consumer credit agreement. As such, this service is able to consider complaints relating to it. Northridge is also the supplier of the goods under this type of agreement, and responsible for a complaint about their quality. I need to clarify that I’m only looking into a complaint about Northridge, rather than the other parties that have been involved here. In this case Section 75 of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 does not apply to this transaction as there is no debtor creditor supplier arrangement. And I’m not able to include multiple parties, compel or interrogate witnesses or marshal sworn evidence in the way that a court does. Satisfactory quality The agreement in this case is a regulated consumer credit agreement. As such, this service
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is able to consider complaints relating to it. Northridge is also the supplier of the goods under this type of agreement, and responsible for a complaint about their quality. The Consumer Rights Act 2015 (CRA) is of particular relevance to this complaint. It says that under a contract to supply goods, there is an implied term that “the quality of the goods is satisfactory.” The CRA says the quality of goods are satisfactory if they meet the standard that a reasonable person would consider satisfactory taking into account any description of the goods, the price and all the other relevant circumstances. In a case involving a car, the other relevant circumstances might include things like the age and mileage at the time of supply and the car’s history. The CRA says the quality of the goods includes their general state and condition and other things like their fitness for purpose, appearance and finish, freedom from minor defects, safety, and durability. When Mr C acquired the car in May 2025 the mileage was around 76,000 and the cash price was around £15,800. The car was first registered in May 2022, so by this stage it was nearly three years old. It wouldn’t be unreasonable to expect the car to be showing some signs of wear and tear, and that might include minor cosmetic defects. There would be very different expectations of it than if it was a brand-new car, but it still needed to be of satisfactory quality when it was supplied. As a starting point there would need to be some evidence of what the fault was. And secondly, that the fault renders the car of unsatisfactory quality. Considering the description of the faults, I don’t think it’s unreasonable for Northridge to have asked for some independent evidence to confirm that the car had a fault. Northridge is responsible for the quality of the car when it is supplied and not issues that might be caused by other equipment or user error. I can appreciate that Mr C has provided video and photographic evidence of the problems he’s experienced in getting the car to start charging on a schedule. But unfortunately, that isn’t enough to demonstrate that there is a fault with the car. I’m not saying something isn’t wrong it’s just that it wasn’t unreasonable to expect some more independent evidence, and that would usually be from either a manufacturer approved diagnostic or some other sort of inspection by a qualified mechanic. The problems he’s experienced could be due to a range of factors including compatibility with his at home charger, software connectivity or even user error. I’m not able to determine which with the evidence that I’ve seen. If he’s not happy to take the car to a manufacturer approved dealer then our investigator can supply him with information about suitably independent mechanical engineers. Mr C also says that one of the keys was supplied without its casing. I’ve not seen any evidence to show that the key didn’t work and given this was a second-hand car I’m not persuaded that this would mean the car wasn’t of satisfactory quality. I understand that Dealer B offered to pay for a replacement, but I don’t find I have grounds to direct Northridge to pay for this, so Mr C can check with Dealer B if this is still available. Negotiations Mr C also said that Dealer B discussed the availability of Android Auto and the remote functionality of the application with him and confirmed that it was all available to him, and it had omitted to mention the paywall which was misleading.
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I think section 56 of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 might also be relevant here. This provision has the effect of deeming Broker D to be the agent of Northridge in any antecedent negotiations. So, Northridge is responsible for the antecedent negotiations Broker D carried out direct with Mr C. Part of the difficulty here is that Broker D, isn’t the same entity as Dealer B. Broker D is set out on the credit agreement as the credit intermediary and would have been acting as Northridge’s agent, not Dealer B. I’ve not been provided with any specific testimony or evidence about what Mr C was or wasn’t told about the car by Broker D. So, although I don’t doubt his testimony about what he told the salesperson, I think that was a discussion he had with Dealer B. I can’t say that I’ve seen anything compelling to show that Broker D misled Mr C or failed to disclose important information about the car. In any event, Mr C has supplied limited evidence on his ability to use Android Auto or the remote features through an application. Online research shows that Android Auto and at least some remote features should be available free of charge. He’s indicated that the feature is present, but it wasn’t compatible with his phone at the time. I accept it might be difficult for him to demonstrate what is wrong in the informal forum that I’m working with. But that doesn’t mean I can hold Northridge responsible to do more. Mr C’s complaint to Northridge was on the basis that there had been a misrepresentation about the features of the car. But he also articulated that he thinks there was a breach of contract because the car was not fit for its intended purpose of using the remote functionality. I’m not persuaded that he’s been able to show that the goods were not fit for the purpose for which they were intended. The goods as defined in the CRA relate to tangible or moveable goods. The CRA does also set out that the goods can include digital content, but the remedies may differ slightly and don’t include treating the contract as at an end. As I’ve explained I’m not persuaded there was sufficient evidence that the goods were not fit for the purpose they were intended, as there isn’t sufficient evidence of a fault with the charging capability, or the Android Auto feature being completely blocked by a paywall rather than it being incompatible with Mr C’s device. I’m also not persuaded that the condition of the second key would make the car of unsatisfactory quality or otherwise not conform to the contract. Mr C has also said that the goods were not as described. But I’ve not seen any compelling evidence that the car was advertised as having these features available, and as I’ve explained even if there was clear evidence of a misrepresentation or omission, Northridge is not responsible for any representations made about the car by Dealer B. Based on the evidence provided, I don’t think Northridge treated Mr C unreasonably by not taking any further action. I appreciate Mr C is unhappy he feels he’s lost out, and I’m sorry to disappoint him. But I’d encourage him to seek support from a manufacturer approved dealer to at least try to resolve his concerns, and while it might not be able to replicate his at home charging set up it could at least rule out other problems by performing a diagnostic check-up. If he’s able to get further independent evidence of a fault with the car, then he can supply this to Northridge to consider afresh. But without sufficient evidence of faults which made the car of unsatisfactory quality, I find I don’t have the grounds to direct Northridge to do anything to resolve this complaint.
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Mr C doesn’t need to accept my decision, and he’ll be free to pursue the complaint by other means, such as through the court where he may be able to include other parties, after obtaining legal advice, as necessary. My final decision My final decision is that I don’t uphold this complaint. Under the rules of the Financial Ombudsman Service, I’m required to ask Mr C to accept or reject my decision before 25 May 2026. Caroline Kirby Ombudsman
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