Revolut Ltd · DRN-6104323

The complaint Mr V complains that Revolut Ltd (“Revolut”) won’t refund the money he lost to a scam. He is represented by a Claims Management Company. For simplicity, I’ll generally refer to Mr V throughout this decision. What happened The background is known to both parties, so I will not repeat it in full. In summary, Mr V says he responded to a social-media advertisement promoting a crypto-investment opportunity. He decided to try things out and was contacted by an individual (he later discovered was a scammer), who gave him access to what appeared to be a legitimate investment platform. Mr V paid a small amount at first and received a small credit in return. Initially, he said he was pressured into making more payments. He then said he was unaware of any further payments after the initial £100. He also said that the scammer had control of his device, applied for loans in his name, and that he realised he was being scammed when the scam communication became threatening and he was unable to withdraw any funds. By that point, more than £35,000 had been sent from Mr V’s newly opened Revolut account, via a genuine account he held with a crypto-platform, between 26 May and 19 June 2025. These payments were funded by savings and two loans for £10,000 and £9,900. The scam was reported to Revolut on 21 June 2025. Mr V then raised a complaint which was referred to our Service. Our Investigator didn’t uphold it. She wasn’t persuaded the payments were made without Mr V’s knowledge or that they were unauthorised. She also wasn’t persuaded that proportionate intervention by Revolut would have prevented Mr V’s losses, given what happened when Revolut and Mr V’s personal bank (“Bank H”) intervened. As the matter couldn’t be resolved informally, it’s been passed to me to decide. What I’ve decided – and why I’ve considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what’s fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. Having done so, I’ve decided not to uphold it for similar reasons as the Investigator. Mr V will understandably be disappointed but these are the key reasons for my decision. Authorisation Under the relevant law – the Payment Services Regulations 2017 – the starting point is that Mr V is responsible for payments he has authorised. In parts of his complaint, Mr V said he was unaware of payments from his Revolut account, aside from the initial £100. But the Investigator has explained why it’s unlikely the payments could have been made by the scammer without Mr V’s involvement. It now appears to be common ground that the payments from Revolut were authorised. But, for completeness, I agree with the position that all the payments were made with Mr V’s knowledge.

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The technical evidence shows the payments were made from Mr V’s device. There is no suggestion anyone else had possession of that device. While Mr V said that the scammer accessed his device via remote software, Revolut restricts what can be viewed in the app when remote access is detected. The scam chat also shows that Mr V was communicating with the fraudster long after the initial £100 payment and that loans were discussed. The sending of payments for “investment” is consistent with the scam Mr V has described (crypto-investment scam) including, for example, the £15,000 sent for purported “escrow fees” as evidenced in the information Mr V has himself submitted. And I note, in appealing the Investigator’s outcome, Mr V himself refers to having sent amounts he believes were significant enough to have triggered Revolut’s fraud prevention systems. I’m satisfied that all the payments were authorised, even if Mr V was instructed to make them as part of a scam and was deceived about the wider context. Prevention In general terms, Revolut is required to execute payments and withdrawals that a customer has authorised. While Revolut is also expected to be alert to the risk of fraud and, in some circumstances, to take proportionate steps to mitigate that risk before processing payments, I think it’s significant that he continued to make payments to the scam despite interventions from both Revolut and Bank H. Revolut intervened on 10 June 2025. Mr V was taken through a series of questions through its automated payment flow. He was told it was important he answered honestly and warned that being coached on what to say, or being pressured into making transactions, could signal a scam. Mr V confirmed he was making the payment by himself and that he hadn’t been asked to instal remote software. He also confirmed that the payment was for “investment” in cryptocurrency. But when asked how he had found the opportunity, he selected “friend or family member”. He confirmed he was sending funds to his account, that he had invested in cryptocurrency before, and that he had checked the FCA Register and reviews. In turn, Revolut warned him about the common aspects of crypto-investment scams. These included promises of high returns, the use of professional-looking platforms, fake investment opportunities promoted through social media, celebrity endorsements, fraudsters targeting less experienced investors, and customers being persuaded to move funds to accounts they don’t control. Mr V was also warned never to grant remote access to his device. I don’t consider Revolut to have been at fault for relying on automated warnings at that point considering, for example, the amounts involved and that the account was newly opened (meaning Revolut had limited information on which to assess risk). And I’m satisfied its intervention was proportionate to the level of risk presented. So, while the warnings didn’t result in the scam being uncovered, I don’t think this was because of significant failings on Revolut’s part. To add, I’m satisfied Mr V was presented with these warnings. If, as was suggested by his representative, it was the scammer who somehow engaged with the warnings, then it’s difficult to see how an intervention could have realistically prevented the scam, given Revolut’s primary method of communication is through its app. I recognise that the spending continued. There was a £9,000 payment on 12 June 2025, followed by £1,100, and £15,000 on 19 June 2025. It’s arguable that Revolut ought to have stepped in again and that, given the increase in spending, a proportionate response would have been a “live” intervention. However, like the Investigator, I’m not persuaded that such an intervention would have likely made a difference in this case.

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Based on what Mr V has said about how the scam was conducted, it seems that some of his responses to some key questions in Revolut’s earlier intervention were inconsistent with the truth. I can’t overlook that he told us he found the opportunity through social media. He also says that he had been asked to download remote access software. And he told us that he hadn’t invested in cryptocurrency before. While Mr V also said he had checked the FCA register, a warning had already been published about this scam before he became involved. I also note that when Bank H called him, on 12 June 2025, to find out more about a payment of £10,200, Mr V said he was sending funds to Revolut to pay for home improvements, citing better exchange rates, and stating he had taken out loans to fund the work. He confirmed no one had forced him to make the payment, asked him to download software, asked him to make the payment for an investment, or asked him to lie or make up a story for the bank. In response to the Investigator’s view, Mr V’s representative said that Mr V wasn’t coached in any way or given a cover story. But that position isn’t supported by the evidence I’ve set out, nor by Mr V’s own scam-reporting call to Bank H. In that call, Mr V clearly stated that he had been coerced by the fraudster and instructed on exactly what to say if questioned by the bank. The scam chat shows there were many calls between Mr V and the fraudster. I’m aware that Revolut would have had different information available than Bank H when assessing a potential scam risk. I don’t rule out the possibility that further “live” intervention by Revolut might have stopped Mr V from making more payments. But given the level of influence the fraudster appears to have had over Mr V – reflected in his comments and the misleading information Mr V had already provided to Revolut and Bank H, despite receiving clear warnings specific to his situation – I don’t consider this to be the more likely scenario. On balance, I’m not persuaded that Mr V wouldn’t have continued to follow the scammer’s guidance or found another way to misrepresent the purpose of the payments in order for them to be processed, believing that he would then be able to access his money. This isn’t a decision I’ve reached lightly. I’m very sorry Mr V was the victim of a scam and that the whole experience has affected him deeply. However, I don’t think it would be fair to uphold this complaint and require Revolut to refund his losses because I’m not persuaded that proportionate steps on its part would have been likely to prevent them. As for recovery, I’m satisfied that there was little Revolut could reasonably have done. The payments were made into Mr V’s own account before being transferred on as part of the scam. Had any funds remained in that account, Mr V would have been able to access them himself. My final decision For the reasons given, I don’t uphold this complaint. Under the rules of the Financial Ombudsman Service, I’m required to ask Mr V to accept or reject my decision before 22 May 2026. Thomas Cardia Ombudsman

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